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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SELECTED PRIORITY PROBLEMS IN SECURED FINANCING
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 9 PRIORITIES
A creditor who demands collateral for his loan seeks assurance that, in the
event of default, his claim will be satisfied out of particular property of the
debtor before that property is used to satisfy the claims of other creditors.'
The secured creditor can obtain this assurance as against the subsequently
arising judicial liens of general creditors by perfecting his interest.2 Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth the prerequisites for perfection
in section 9-303(1):
.A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the
applicable steps required for perfection have been taken ....
The elements of attachment are enumerated in section 9-204(1) :
A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement... that it attach
and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. It attaches
as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken place
unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
In a few special cases, perfection entails no further action.3 Normally,
however, an additional step is required. When goods, documents of title
or chattel paper are used as collateral, either possession by the secured
party or the filing of a financing statement is necessary for perfection.4 If con-
tract rights, accounts receivable or general intangibles are used, the additional
1. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(1) (procedures on default) [hereinafter
cited as UCC; unless the 1958 Supplement is specifically indicated, citations are to the
1957 Official Text].
2. See UCC § 9-301 (1) (b). The comment to this section states: "[T]he term 'per-
fected' is used to describe a security interest in personal property which cannot be de-
feated in insolvency proceedings or in general by creditors." An unperfected purchase-
money security interest takes priority over a lien creditor for ten days after the secured
party gives value, provided the interest is perfected within ten days. UCC § 9-301(2).
3. Interests which become perfected upon attachment are set forth in UCC § 9-302.
They include: a security interest temporarily perfected in instruments or documents with-
out delivery under § 9-304, or in proceeds for a ten-day period under § 9-306; a purchase-
money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not in excess of
$2,500, or in consumer goods (but filing is required for a fixture under § 9-313); an
assignment of accounts or contract rights which does not alone or in conjunction with
other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding
accounts or contract rights of the assignor.
4. UCC § 9-305 (possession); UCC § 9-302 (filing).
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step is filing ;r if negotiable or other instruments, possession." Hence, perfection
ordinarily consists of an agreement for attachment, the giving of value, the
debtor's obtaining rights in the collateral, and filing or possession. It is achieved
once all of these events have occurred, regardless of their sequence.
7
The time at which these steps are taken generally determines the priority of
conflicting security interests in the same collateral. Except for certain instances
treated elsewhere in the Code, priority is governed by the rules set forth in
section 9-312(5). If all competing interests are perfected by filing, the first filed
prevails irrespective of the time of attachment.8 An interest is deemed "perfected
by filing" so long as filing is the step which, along with attachment, produces
perfection; the fact that filing may precede all the elements of attachment is
irrelevant. 9 When any competing interest is not perfected by filing, the order
of perfection determines priority without regard to the time of attachment. 10
Under the Code, collateral subject to conflicting security interests is applied
initially to satisfy all debts covered by the security agreements of the creditor
who has first priority." Suppose, for example, that creditor A files a financing
statement describing equipment which secures his loan of $50,000 to the debtor;
and that, under the security agreement, the same collateral is to secure any future
advances which the parties in their discretion may agree upon. 12 Suppose,
further, that B then lends the debtor $25,000, to be secured by the same equip-
ment, and that B perfects by filing subsequent to A. If A later makes an addi-
tional advance of $25,000, his superior rights in the collateral will extend to
the entire $75,000 due him, inasmuch as time of attachment is irrelevant under
the first-to-file rule.1 3 Thus, on default, B will get nothing unless the collateral
5. UCC § 9-305, comment 1.
6. UCC § 9-304(1.).
7. UCC § 9-303(1).
8. UCC § 9-312(5) (a) (1958 Supp.). UCC § 9-312(5) (1958 Supp.) provides:
In all cases -not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases
of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities
set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting
security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which
security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and whether it at-
tached before or after filing;
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing, regardless of
which security interests attached first under Section 9-204(1) and, in the
case of a filed security interest, whether it attached before or after filing;
and
(c) in the order of attachment under Section 9-204(1) so long as neither is
perfected.
9. See UCC § 9-303(1) and comment 1.
10. UCC § 9-312(5) (b) (1958 Supp.), quoted note 8 supra.
11. UCC § 9-504(1).
12. UCC § 9-204(5) expressly validates the future-advances clause.
13. See UCC § 9-312, comment 4, example 4.
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is sold for a net price in excess of $75,000. Similarly, even if the original agree-
ment between A and the debtor provides only for the loan of $50,000 and not
the future advances, a later agreement between them providing for an additional
loan of $25,000 against the same equipment can enable A's initial financing
statement to accord both his loans priority. The later agreement, advances
thereunder, and the debtor's acquiring rights in the collateral will cause A's
security interest izovering the new advances to attach; and the filing made at the
time of the original agreement will constitute the necessary step for perfection.
By virtue of the first-to-file rule, A will have superior rights in the collateral
for a total of $75,000. On the other hand, if the original security agreement
between A and the debtor does not provide for future advances, and if the
second advance by A is not accompanied by a security agreement specifying
the equipment as collateral, A's first filing would not embrace his subsequent
advance of $25,000.14
A prospective lender, such as B above, who desires collateral unencumbered
by prior liens may of course seek security in property not covered by any pre-
viously filed statement. Faced with a debtor all of whose present property is
encumbered, the new lender can acquire a first priority by obtaining a security
interest in new acquisitions. Assuming no earlier filing embraced after-acquired
property,1 the new lender, as the first to file and perfect an interest in the
recent acquisitions, will have priority in them. If the filing of another party
already covers those acquisitions, the new lender can still achieve priority
through a purchase-money security interest. (Under the Code, a third party
as well as the seller may be a purchase-money financer.'8 ) When the collateral is
other than inventory, a purchase-money security interest will attain priority over
a conflicting interest if the purchase-money interest is perfected within ten days
of the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral., 7 Priority is similarly
available to a purchase-money financer of inventory, provided he both notifies
parties whose conflicting claims are actually or constructively known, and per-
fects his interest before the debtor receives possession.' 8
A lender who attempts to utilize already encumbered property as collateral
must determine the amount by which the value of the property exceeds the
14. See ibid.; UCC § 9-204, comment 8.
15. UCC § 9-204(3) expressly validates agreements encumbering "collateral when-
ever acquired."
16. A security interest is a '!purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral -to secure all or a part of
its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral
if such value is in fact so used.
UCC § 9-107.
17. UCC § 9-312(4) (1958 Supp.). Until this section was amended in December
1958, the interest had to be perfected before the debtor received the collateral.
18. UCC § 9-312(3) (1958 Supp.) ; see text following note 58 infra.
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indebtedness which the property secures or is committed to secure. While the
nature and extent of existing encumbrances need not be made a matter of
public record under the Code's simplified system of notice filing, every filed
financing statement must contain the name and address of the encumbrancer,
so that prospective lenders can request the details of existing credit arrange-
ments. 19 Taking advantage of section 9-208, a debtor who desires to borrow
from a prospective lender can submit a statement of the collateral securing, and
the amount due on, outstanding obligations. Should the encumbrancer, without
reasonable excuse, fail to approve or correct the statement within two weeks,
he would become liable for any loss which this failure caused the debtor;
moreover, "the secured party may [then] claim a security interest only as
shown in the statement against persons misled by his failure to comply." 2"
Thus, a potential creditor can determine with certainty the exact amount of
outstanding encumbrances-and make advances accordingly.
An already filed financing statement can, however, cover future advances
by the prior encumbrancer: hence section 9-208 is of limited utility. Although
the value of the collateral may support another loan, the second lender has no
assurance that the first will not make subsequent advances which, by virtue of
the latter's initial filing, will enjoy priority. Recall the above example in which
the debtor obtained successive loans from A of $50,000 and $25,000 under an
agreement providing for future advances (or, alternatively, under successive
agreements). Suppose that before he repaid the $50,000 or received the $25,000
the debtor, seeking credit from B, submitted a statement to A erroneously indi-
cating the outstanding obligation as $45,000; that .- failed to correct the error:
and that the debtor then showed the statement to B, who made a loan of $25,000.
After A's subsequent $25,000 advance, he would normally have priority as to
the entire $75,000 due him.21 But, having failed to correct a good-faith state-
ment of the debtor, A may claim priority "only as shown in the statement,"
that is, in the amount of $45,000. Nonetheless, A's neglect should result in a
loss of priority only as to the $5,000 error on the first advance, and not as to the
subsequent $25,000 advance. The uncorrected statement gave B no reason to
think that A would not make future advances or that such advances, if made,
would be subordinate to B's.
Apparently, the draftsmen of the Code were anxious to discourage non,
purchase-money multiple financing, and therefore did not protect intervening
lenders like B against subordination to subsequent advances by a prior encum-
brancer like A. Of course, so long as A voluntarily avoids taking more collateral
than necessary adequately to secure his loan, B cannot complain. Since credi-
tors generally prefer repayment to foreclosure, the wise lender will not tie up
so much property that the debtor's ability to obtain necessary credit is impaired.
Furthermore, competition among financing agencies may prevent any given
lender from demanding excessive security. When collateral, originally reason-
19. UCC § 9-402(1) and accompanying comment.
20. UCC § 9-208(2).
21. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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able in the light of expected debts, has for some reason become excessive, a loan
agency seeking to preserve good will may voluntarily decide to surrender its
priority as to future advances. On the other hand, an amply secured party in
this situation may desire to retain its monopoly of the debtor's credit, even
if the latter would prefer to acquire all future advances elsewhere.
A new lender can protect his interest in a variety of ways despite a prior
secured party's refusal to cooperate. If the debtor's loan agreement with the first
party permits accelerated payment, the new lender, anxious to establish a
continuing relationship with the debtor, may lend him enough to repay the
original loan. The debtor may then exact from the prior secured party a dis-
claimer of any security interest in the collateral.2 2 Another but less certain
protection of the new lender's interest may also be available. The debtor might
promise not to accept future advances from his first financer unless the latter
agrees that any claims in the collateral arising from the future advances will
be subordinated to claims based on the intervening loans of the new creditor.
Notice of this agreement could then be sent to the first secured party. Any
advance made by that party after receiving such notice could be treated as
subordinate to the new creditor's loans on the theory that the first secured
part), had induced the debtor to breach a contract.23 Still, a court might hold
that the breach left the priority provisions of the Code undisturbed; and that
it gave the intervening lender a right to sue for damages-the amount by
which the priority attaching to the first secured party's later advances pre-
vented the second lender from satisfying his claims. 24 But the latter's status
as an unsecured creditor of the first encumbrancer may not be equivalent to
his position as a holder of a first-priority security interest in the assets of the
original debtor. If the first encumbrancer becomes insolvent, the second lender
may find himself in the position of a general creditor claiming dividends in
the distribution of a bankrupt's estate. Besides, the fact that actions for dam-
22. UCC § 9-404(1). Such a statement may be presented to the filing officer who
will remove the original financing statement from the files. UCC § 9-404(2).
23. When the party inducing the breach has knowledge of the existing contract and
induces breach to gain the benefit of the contract for himself, he has the required tortious
intention. See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631. (1941). There
may, however, be a question of causation. According to some courts, the mere entering
into a contract with knowledge of a previous inconsistent contract is not in itself a
"cause" of the breach of the prior contract. E.g., Sweeney v. Smith, 167 Fed. 385 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 171 Fed. 645 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 215 U.S. 600 (1909).
Some authority exists, however, for imposing liability on the later-contracting party. See,
e.g., Wade v. Culp, 107 Ind. App. 503, 23 N.E.2d 615 (1939). On procurement of breach
of contract, see generally 1 HARPER & JAUES, TORTS §§ 6.5-6.8 (1956) ; Carpenter, In-
terference With Contract Relations, 41- HAv. L. REv. 728 (1928); Note, 40 COLUm. L.
Rav. 1094 (1940).
24. Damages for procuring breach of contract are ascertained as if -the action were
upon contract instead of tort. McNutt Oil & Ref. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d
966 (1955). Damages are ordinarily limited to the actual loss incurred. Wade v. Culp,
stapra note 23.
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ages necessitate the expense and delay of litigation may eliminate them as a
commercially realistic alternative to priority.
Once a debtor who is a good credit risk and who requires additional financing
ceases to deal with a prior encumbrancer, the encumbrancer's filed statement
covering all available collateral can serve only to frustrate relations between the
debtor and a would-be lender. The prospective lender cannot be sure that the
debtor will refrain from accepting advances under the statement and thus
further subordinating any claims that the would-be lender may make against
the collateral. Moreover, the Code's policy of fostering a continuing relation-
ship between the debtor and the prior encumbrancer can no longer be served
since, by hypothesis, that relationship has deteriorated. In this situation, the
debtor should be able to escape the inhibitions of a comprehensive financing
statement-assuming he has not expressly bound himself to borrow only from
the existing encumbrancer. The debtor's earlier assent to the statement should
not be deemed to establish his consent to exclusive financing, because, per-
haps anticipating purchase-money loans, he may not have been aware of the
extent to which he could later be limited in acquiring outside credit. For
this reason, means should be provided whereby a debtor can give a prospective
lender adequate assurance that, despite an outstanding filing statement, the
new lender will not be subordinated to later loans by the prior secured party.
This assurance could be given if the Code were amended to authorize the
debtor to file an effective, prospective repudiation of a filing statement on
giving proper notice to the original creditor. The effect of such notice would
be to limit the original creditor's priority under the outstanding statement
to the amount then due him plus any amount which he is obligated to lend
and the debtor to receive.
PRIORITIES AND ARTICLE 2 OF THE CODE
Not all security interests arise under article 9. The article on sales (article
2) gives the seller and, in certain cases, a financing agency 25 various rights
against the goods which are the subject of a sale. Some of these rights are
considered security interests governed by article 9, as provided in section 9-
113:
A security, interest arising solely under the Article on Sales... is sub-
ject to the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and
so long as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain posses-
sion of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest
enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest .... a1
25. See notes 48-57 infra and accompanying text.
26. The section concludes: "(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the
debtor are governed by the Article on Sales.... UCC § 9-113. The article 2 provisions
on default differ from those of article 9 in one major respect: a seller is not account-
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An agreement is unnecessary to create the security interest, since it arises
by operation of law in the course of a sales transaction. 27 Filing is dispensed
with because the security interest is promptly liquidated, and because, as in
the case of a pledge, the debtor does not have possession of the goods; third
parties are therefore protected against reliance on ostensible ownership.
28
The Seller's Security Interest
The seller's article 2 security interest consists of the right, upon buyer's
default or insolvency, to withhold or stop delivery of goods in the hands of
a carrier or other bailee. In addition, under section 2-505(1) (a), a seller
may reserve "a security interest in the goods" by procuring a bill of lading.
As a practical matter, the latter interest simply provides a way to implement
the right to withhold or stop delivery.29
Under section 2-702(2), the seller has the additional right to reclaim goods
upon demand made within ten days after receipt by the buyer, if the buyer
received them on credit while insolvent. This right is probably not a security
interest. If it were, and the debtor's possession of the goods were deemed
lawful, section 9-113 would require the seller to obtain and file notice of a
written security agreement in order to protect his right of reclamation against
lien creditors.3 But to make reclamation rights dependent upon compliance
with the article 9 prerequisites for a security interest would be to render
section 2-702(2) functionless, since the seller, by filing notice of a valid agree-
ment, would derive from article 9 alone all of the rights provided by section
2-702(2), and more.3' Unless section 2-702(2) is totally supererogatory, the
right of reclamation is not conditioned on compliance with article 9 and is
not, therefore, a security interest. Furthermore, although the comment to
section 9-113 suggests that the right to withhold or stop delivery is a security
interest, it makes no reference to the right to reclaim. This latter right is the
Code's analogue to the seller's traditional remedy of rescission and recovery,
available when goods have been delivered following the buyer's fraudulent
misrepresentation of himself as solvent.3 2 The introduction of a conclusive
presumption of fraud resting on the fact of insolvency does not require a de-
able to the defaulting buyer for any profit made on a resale. UCC § 2-706(6). On the
other hand, a financing agency holding an article 2 security interest (like a secured
lender under article 9) must account to the buyer for any excess over the amount due
on the debt plus the costs of sale. Ibid.; UCC § 9-504(2).
27. UCC § 9-113, comment.
28. See ibid.
29. See note 48 infra.
30. For UCC § 9-113, see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
31. Under the default provisions of article 9 (UCC §§ 9-501 to -507), the seller
could take the goods to satisfy his debt without regard to the debtor's 'insolvency and
even though demand for them was not made within ten days after receipt.
32. Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial
Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. REv. 571, 580 (1958).
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parture from the accepted view that the right to rescind and recover is not
a security interest.
33
The seller's right of reclamation is inferior to a perfected security interest
in the goods arising under an after-acquired property clause. Section 2-702(3)
subordinates the seller's right to reclaim to the rights of a "good faith pur-
chaser" under section 2-403, which in turn provides that "a person with
voidable title has power to transfer title to a good faith purchaser for value."
The buyer whose goods are subject to the seller's right of reclamation has
"voidable title."' 34 "Good faith" requires only honesty in fact ;35 "purchaser"
includes the holder of a security interest ;36 and "value" exists when an in-
terest is acquired as security for a pre-existing claim.3 7 Consequently, the
holder of a perfected security interest prevails over a seller attempting to
reclaim goods delivered to an insolvent buyer.
The position of the reclaiming seller as against unsecured creditors is lesb
clear. According to section 2-702, the right of reclamation is inferior to the
section 2-403 rights of lien creditors. Section 2-403 says that the lien cred-
itors' rights are governed by article 9. The only conceivably relevant pro-
vision in article 9 is section 9-301, which defines the rights of lien creditors
vis-i-vis unperfected security interests; since the reclaiming seller is not ex-
ercising a security interest, his status in relation to lien creditors is undefined.
In the absence of a specific Code provision, local law is probably deter-
minative. Before the Code, a defrauded seller could rescind and recover as
against all unsecured creditors of the buyer, even though they may have levied
on the goods before rescission. 3 An exception to this rule obtained in a
minority of jurisdictions which granted priority to the lender who, relying on
the buyer's ostensible ownership, had extended credit after the buyer had
taken possession of the goods.3 9 The seller's right of reclamation, though
broadened by the Code's conclusive presumption of fraud, probably has the
same priority over unsecured creditors as the seller's pre-Code right of rescis-
sion. This conclusion is confirmed by the comment to section 2-702 which.
in explaining why the successful reclamation of goods excludes the seller's
other remedies with respect to them, states that the right of reclamation
"constitutes preferential treatment as against the buyer's other creditors." On
the other hand, the comment appears to be contradicted by the statement in
section 2-702 that the right to reclaim is "subject to the rights of lien cred-
itors under this Article," a passage which misleadingly suggests that, some-
where, tht Code permits the lien creditor to prevail. If uniformity is to re-
33. For the accepted view, see, e.g., ibid.
34. See 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 567, at 208 (1948).
35. UGC § 1-201(19).
36. UCC §§ 1-201(32), (33).
37. UCC § 1-201(44) (b).
38. *See Annot., 21 A.L.R. 1031, 1033 (1922) (collecting cases).
39. E.g., Gilbert v. Hudson, 4 Me. 345 (1826) ; see Annot., 21 A.L.R. 1031 (1922).
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place local differences on the rights of lien creditors, a clarifying amendment
is needed.
Also unclear is whether the seller's right of reclamation will prevail against
an unperfected security interest. If such an interest is sufficient to make the
holder thereof "a good faith purchaser for value," it presumably enjoys prior-
ity.4 0 The seller, however, is ordinarily superior to lien creditors, 4' and lien
creditors are superior to holders of unperfected security interests.42 Thus,
the seller would seem to be superior to the holder of an unperfected interest.
Whether the seller will always be able to exercise his right of reclamation
against the trustee in bankruptcy is even less clear. The preference given a
seller who, on demonstrating fraud, rescinds and recovers has been held not
to violate the bankruptcy objective of equal distribution among creditors of
the same class.4 3 The seller is regarded not as a general creditor but as the
proper owner repossessing goods from one who has wrongfully deprived him
of possession. 44 In the past, however, sellers who have prevailed against a
trustee in bankruptcy were rescinding on the basis of some indication of actual
fraud,4 5 such as the buyer's being so hopelessly insolvent at the time he ac-
cepts the goods that he could not reasonably expect to pay.46 If the Code
right of reclamation given in 'ection 2-702 is simply based on an expanded
definition of fraud, then, presumably, the seller will prevail against the trus-
tee as under prior law. Section 2-702 can be read, however, to grant a right
to reclaim even when the buyer's insolvency after he receives the goods does
not suggest actual fraud. In this situation, the seller's claim would be repug-
nant to the policy of equal distribution among creditors and for this reason
may constitute a preference voidable in bankruptcy.
47
The Financing Agency's Security Interest
Under section 2-506, a party which, by paying or purchasing for value a
draft relating to goods, finances a sales transaction for either buyer or seller,
obtains the seller's "rights . . . in the goods including the right to stop
delivery .... ,,48 Presumably, therefore, since reclamation is one of the sell-
40. See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
41. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
4. UCC § 9-301 (1) (b). Unperfected purchase-money security interests have prior-
ity for ten days in accordance with UCC § 9-301(2). See note 2 supra.
43. See Annot., 59 A.L..R. 418 (1929) (collecting cases).
44. Ibid.
45. See COLLIE , BANKRUPTCY MANUAL % 70.26 (2d ed. 1954); 3 WILLISTON, SALES
§ 637, at 457 & nn.3-4 (1948).
46. California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1933).
47. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(a), (b), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 96(a), (b) (1952) ; Yankwich, Preferences Under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,
27 REF. J. 31 (1953).
48. (1) A financing agency by paying or purchasing for value a draft which relates
to a shipment of goods acquires to the extent of the payment or purchase and in
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er's rights in the goods, a financing agency would succeed to that right.4
0
On the other hand, section 2-707's enumeration of the rights of a "person in
the position of a seller" includes the right to withhold or stop delivery but
not the right of reclamation.5° "Person in the position of a seller" is, never-
theless, a broader classification than "'financing agency,"5 1 and the more re-
stricted grant of rights to the broader category ("person in the position of a
seller") may be read not to limit the rights of a component of that class
("financing agency") under a separate provision.
If it does succeed to the right to reclaim, the financing agency can, in effect,
acquire a limited type of security interest without meeting the requirements
addition to its own rights under the draft and any document of title securing it
any rights of the shipper in the goods including the right to stop delivery and the
shipper's right to have the draft honored by the buyer.
(2) The right to reimbursement of a financing agency which has in good faith
honored or purchased the draft under commitment to or authority from the buyer
is not impaired by subsequent discovery of defects with reference to any relevant
document which was apparently regular on its face.
UCc § 2-506.
When a negotiable bill of lading covers the goods, the financing agency may enforce
its right of stoppage by obtaining the bill from the seller and surrendering it to the car-
rier. See UCC § 2-705(3) (c). When a nonnegotiable bill has been issued, however, a
carrier is not obliged to honor a stop order from one other than the consignor. UCC
§ 2-705(3) (d). If the seller rather than the financing agency is designated consignor,
the financing agency may exercise its right of stoppage only through the seller. Pre-
sumably, a power of attorney from seller to financing agency authorizing the latter to
issue a stop order in the seller's name upon buyer's default or insolvency would be re-
pugnant to the statutory scheme. (The comment to UCC § 2-506 states: "This section
does not attempt to create any new rights in the financing agency against the carrier
which would force the latter to honor a stop order from the agency, a stranger to the
shipment.. .")
Whether held by the seller or a financing agency, the right to stop delivery has
priority as a purchase-money security interest. Under UCC §§ 9-312(3), (4) (1958
Supp.), until the collateral comes into the possession of the buyer, a perfected purchase-
money interest prevails over conflicting interests. Thus, the seller or financing agency's,
right to stop delivery has priority over the rights of any other secured creditor of the
buyer.
49. The language of UCC § 2-506, quoted note 48 supra, suggests a broad transfer
of rights. The concluding clause can be read merely to enumerate specific rights rather
than to limit the rights transferred. As a practical matter, a financing agency will not
ordinarily need to exercise the right of reclamation. A bank discounting seller's draft
will usually require a sight draft, so that it will be paid before the buyer obtains posses-
sion of the goods. A buyer's bank that contemplates a credit extension beyond the docu-
mentary phase of a given transaction will commonly have a prior security agreement.
50. "A person in the position of a seller may as provided in this Article withhold
or stop delivery (section 2-705) and resell (section 2-706) and recover incidental dam-
ages (section 2-710)." UCC § 2-707(2). See the comment thereto.
51. "A 'person in the position of a seller' includes as against a principal an agent
who has paid or become responsible for the price of goods on behalf of his principal or
anyone who otherwise holds a security interest or other right in goods similar to that
of a seller." UCC § 2-707(1).
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of article 9. Normally, exercise of the right to reclaim is contingent on de-
mand made within ten days after the buyer's receipt of the goods.52 When
the seller repossesses promptly upon demand, the duration of his secret lien
is no greater than that possible under the twenty-one day automatic perfection
which the Code gives his unfiled interest in documents released to a buyer.5 3
When, however, a written misrepresentation of solvency was made to the
seller within three months of delivery, the ten-day limitation does not apply.
4
Although some promptness in reclaiming must probably be exercised-lest
the right of reclamation be lost on the ground of laches or on the theory that
retention of possession by the buyer was fraudulent as against his cred-
itors r-_, the seller, and the financing agency succeeding to the seller's right,
still have for an indefinite time a right in the goods which prevails against
lien creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy. This right, if in the seller, is
based on actual fraud, and may therefore be unobjectionable.5 6 In contrast,
the seller's financer, relying on the seller's credit rather than the buyer's,
arguably should not receive priority over the buyer's creditors. And the buy-
er's financer, who necessarily looks -to the buyer's credit, should be expected
to perfect a security interest in the latter's goods before being allowed to pre-
vail over lien creditors.
Ample ground exists for holding that reclamation is not a section 2-506
"right in the goods," and for denying that right to a financing agency. Viewed
as a right to rescind for fraud, reclamation could be deemed personal to the
seller. Furthermore, though not a security interest when exercised by the
seller, the right to reclaim might be considered such an interest when acquired
by a financing agency. Section 9-113 would then require filing and a security
agreement for the continued perfection of the interest.57 While the Code could
thus be construed to deny reclamation to financing agencies, this result should
not depend on the vagaries of judicial interpretation. A clarifying amendment
should specify that the seller's right to reclaim does not pass to the financing
agency.
THE PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTEREST
Section 9-312 and the December 1958 Amendments
By enabling the holder of a purchase-money security interest to achieve
priority, the Code permits the debtor with already encumbered property to
present prospective creditors with attractive security for additional loans. If
the proferred collateral is other than inventor)' and if the lender's interest is
52. UCC §2-702(2).
53. UCC §§ 9-304(4), (5).
54. UCC § 2-702(2).
55. See 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 648, at 488 & nn.3-4 (1948, Supp. 1958).
56. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra. If the seller's right to reclaim is entire-
ly independent of fraud on the part of the buyer, the right may be voidable as a prefer-
ence in bankruptcy. See text following note 46 supra.
57. Note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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perfected before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral, first priority is assured.5 8 If the collateral is inventory, a creditor
who wants to attain priority by virtue of being a purchase-money financer
must comply with the following provisions of section 9-312(3) (as amended,
December 1958):
(a) [T]he purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral; and
(b) any secured party whose security interest is known to the holder of
the purchase money security interest or who, prior to the date of the
filing made by the holder of the purchase money security interest, had
filed a financing statement covering the same items or type of inven-
tory, has received notification of the purchase money security interest
before the debtor receives possession of the collateral covered by the
purchase money security interest; and
(c) such notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects
to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the
debtor, describing such inventory by item or type.
Controversy exists as to whether the requirement of notice will adversely
affect the debtor's opportunity to procure credit.59 Much purchase-money
financing is for the purpose of supplying small businessmen the low-cost funds
necessary to obtain purchased goods from a carrier with promptness and with-
out extra storage charges.60 It has been argued that the time required to in-
spect public records and notify parties having security interests in the col-
lateral at issue will hamstring small businessmen-borrowers in need of in-
stant, short-term loans.61 Under the Code's centralized and simplified system
of notice filing, however, the existence of a previously filed conflicting in-
terest can easily be ascertained. 62 And, when speed is essential, a telephone
58. UCC § 9-312(4) (1958 Supp.).
59. NEwV YORK LAW REVISION ColI'N, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMM11AERCIAL CODE-
MEmORANDA PRESENTED TO THE COMIXSSION AND STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF PUBLIC
HEARING ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE CODE 1133-42 (Legis. Doc. No. 65(H), 1954).
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. See UCC §§ 9-401, -402.
Before the Code, security interests in personal property took such forms as the chattel
mortgage, conditional sale, bailment lease, trust receipt, and factor's lien. See Gilmore,
Chattel Securiy, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 761 (1948). If recording was required, each different
interest might be filed in a different place. UCC § 9-101, comment. Not only was title
searching made difficult for third parties, but security interests could be invalidated if
they turned out to be filed in the wrong set of records. Ibid.; UCC § 9-401, comment 5;
Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restateinent and Revision of Chattel Security, 1952 Wis. L.
Rav. 348, 383. And under the detailed filing requirements of many states, the slightest
error in describing the property or parties would invalidate the interest. E.g., General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952) (designation
of "E. R. Millen Co., Inc." as "E. R. Millen Company" rendered the filing statement
invalid).
Under the Code, a single security agreement may provide for advances to be secured
by both present and after-acquired property, UCC § 9-204(3), and by any proceeds re-
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call to a secured party of record will effect adequate notification-unless the
doubtful integrity of that party dictates written communication.
Any inconvenience occasioned by the notification requirement seems rea-
sonable so long as it subserves the financing of inventory which is constantly
sold and replenished. The Code, by abolishing the rule that the lender must
police his collateral 63 and validating the after-acquired property clause,
6 4
provides lenders with readily available security and borrowers with corre-
spondingly accessible sources of credit. It 'encourages a relationship whereby
the inventory financer makes periodic advances, since he does not have to
refile for each advance. 65 This relationship merits the protection which noti-
fication by purchase-money lenders achieves. The general inventory financer
is thereby- alerted that new acquisitions are encumbered; he can then refuse
to make additional advances, and demand payment out of the proceeds re-
ceived when his collateral is sold by the debtor.66
Before the 1958 amendments, section 9-312(3) required that notice be
given "any secured party . . . who has previously filed a financing statement
covering the same item." If "previously" meant previous to making each of
a series of purchase-money advances rather than previous to filing notice of
an intention to make the advances, the purchase-money lender who wished
to achieve priority under 9-312(3) was saddled with the burdensome neces-
sity of checking the records before every individual advance. Furthermore,
ceived on disposition of that property, UCC § 9-306. The agreement may also provide
that security shall be collateral for both present and future advances. UCC § 9-204(5).
Filing is made as simple as possible. All security interests in personal property may be
filed in a single set of records, unless the state adopts an optional provision requiring
local as well as central filing. UCC § 9-401. (Security interests in fixtures are to be
filed where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded. UCC
§ 9-401 (1) (b).) The filing statement need only contain the signatures and addresses of
the lender and borrower, and a description of the collateral by item or type. UCC § 9-
402(1). If the details of the credit transaction are desired, third parties may consult the
lender and borrower. UCC § 9-402, comment 2. A filed statement is effective for five
years and is renewable without limit. UCC § 9-403.
63. UCC § 9-205.
64. UCC §9-204(3).
65. UCC § 9-402, comment.
66. UCC § 9-312(3), comment 3.
The basis of the notice requirement in § 9-312(3) is that, since a general inventory
financer expects to make periodic advances on the basis of incoming inventory, he ought
to be notified if any of the incoming goods are subject to a superior, unfiled security
interest. The notice requirement is imposed, however, only when the incoming goods are
subject to a superior interest of the purchase-money type, even though unfiled superior
interests can also arise under the first-to-perfect rule. If a pledgee perfected an interest
in goods by possession prior to the time that the general inventory financer perfected
through filing, the superior interest of the first to perfect continues even after the goods
are released to the debtor, provided the erstwhile pledgee's interest is then filed. To pro-
tect the general inventory financer, the first to perfect could be allowed to maintain his
priority after possession is surrendered only if he gives notice at that time to any filed
interests. See notes 113-15 infra and accompanying text.
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the pre-1958 Code was not clear on whether a purchase-money lender who
failed to give proper notice was automatically subordinated to conflicting
security interests, or whether he could still obtain priority under some section
other than 9-312(3). Last December's amendment to section 9-312(5) in-
dicates that a purchase-money financer who does not achieve priority under
9-312(3) may still do so under either the first-to-file rule of section 9-312
(5) (a) or the first-to-perfect rule of section 9-312(5) (b).67 The unamended
9-312(5) had declared, simply and ambiguously, that it applied to "all cases
not governed by other rules stated in... section [9-312]." And the comment
to the old section 9-312 had gone on to say that "subsection 5 does not apply
to any case where one of the conflicting interests is a purchase money interest,
since all such cases are covered by subsections (3) and (4)."63 The statement
in 9-312(3) that the purchase-money interest prevails "if" notice is given was
thus read "only if" notice is given. Under this interpretation, a purchase-
money financer who failed to comply with 9-312(3) could not obtain prior-
ity under either subsection (a) (first-to-file) or (b) (first-to-perfect) of
9-312(5). 69
In cases in which the purchase-money financer has filed ahead of any con-
flicting interest, requiring him to give notice before each advance would pre-
vent him from taking full advantage of the filing system.70 Commonly, he has
entered into a security agreement with a debtor who is seeking to finance
future purchases of inventory by utilizing prospective inventory to secure a
succession of purchase-money advances. 71 The first-to-file rule should be
applied to this type of transaction, since it allows "the secured party who has
filed first to make subsequent advances without each time having, as a con-
dition of protection, to check for filings later than his," 72 and since it there-
fore facilitates the maintenance of a continuing series of advances and repay-
ments between borrower and lender. Credit is readily available for the bor-
67. "In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases
of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set
forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting security
interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows: .... " UCC § 9-312(5)
(1958 Supp.).
68. UCC § 9-312, comment 4. See UCC § 9-312, reason for change (1958 Supp.).
If the draftsmen had intended that purchase-money lenders should not win except under
§ 9-312(3), specific language to that effect could have been used. On its face, even old
§ 9-312(3) defines priority only for situations in which the purchase-money lender has
given notice prescribed by that section. If the purchase-money lender did not give notice,
he would then be outside the reach of § 9-312(3), and priority would be determined by
the general principles of § 9-312(5), quoted note & supra.
69. See UCC § 9-312, comment 4.
70. "Notice filing has proved to be of great use in financing transactions involving
inventory, accounts and chattel paper, since it obviates the necessity of refiling on each
of a series of transactions in a continuing arrangement where the collateral changes
from day to day." UCC § 9-402, comment 2.
7L Such an arrangement is permitted by UCC § 9-204(3).
72. UCC § 9-312, comment 4.
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rower; the lender has a steady customer; and cheaper financing is fostered
because the borrower's credit standing need not be continually re-established.
The purchase-money lender's filing constitutes a public record that future
advances may be secured by incoming inventory. If these advances were
secured by the same inventory but intended to finance the conduct of ordinary
business operations, the lender could achieve priority over other parties in
the absence of notification.73 That the advances actually constitute the pur-
chase price of new acquisitions should not, and since last December, does
not, make notification any more necessary.
The principal difficulty presented by the old section 9-312(3) was not that
known parties had to be notified, for generally no conflicting security interest
would exist, but rather that the records had to be re-examined repeatedly to
discover whether another financer had appeared on the scene. Under the
present 9-312(3), this burden has been removed: the priority of a purchase-
money financer who has filed depends only on his notifying those persons who
have previously filed (or whose conflicting interests are actually known to
him). If the conflicting interests were filed after the purchase-money interest,
no notice whatever is required, because the purchase-money lender, though
he has not complied with 9-312(3), has priority as the first to file under
9-312(5) (a). And since his name and address are on record, the holders of
conflicting interests can make inquiries of him if they wish to protect them-
selves.
The First-To-Perfect Rule
In contrast with the operation of the first-to-file rule, applying the first-to-
perfect rule in the context of a purchase-money lender who fails to give notice
engenders complex priority problems not amenable to happy solution. Con-
sider the following situation. A general inventory financer, I, advances money
to a debtor and files a financing statement covering all of the debtor's inven-
tory. Subsequently, the debtor's purchase-money financer, PM, honors a draft
which the debtor's seller has drawn, and thus finances the debtor's purchase
of new goods. PM receives in return a negotiable bill of lading covering the
goods in the hands of a carrier; he later releases the bill to the debtor, who
delivers it to the carrier and obtains his goods. PM then files his security in-
terest.
PM's perfection of a security interest in the goods arises through his per-
fection, by possession, of a security interest in the document of title.74 So long
as be retains the document, he will enjoy priority over I or any holder of
"an earlier security interest even though perfected. '75 Once the document is
73. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
74. UCC § 9-302 provides for perfection of a security interest in negotiable docu-
ments by possession.
75. UCC § 9-309. In the example posited, the buyer's bank is financing purchase of
the new acquisition through a long-term extension of credit. A buyer's bank could also
limit its role to the documentary phase of a given transaction, demanding payment from
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released to the debtor, PM's interest remains perfected for twenty-one days
without filing, since the debtor's possession of the document is for the purpose
of eventually selling the goods.76 If PM files a financing statement within
twenty-one days, his interest is continuously perfected from the time he orig-
inally perfected an interest in the document.77 Since, in determining priority,
a continuously perfected interest which was originally perfected otherwise than
by filing is treated as at all times perfected otherwise than by filing,78 priority
is governed by the first-to-perfect rule of section 9-312(5) (b).79
Unless postponed by explicit agreement, the perfection of I's security in-
terest occurs when value is given, the debtor "has rights in the collateral,"
and any step necessary for perfection-in this case, filing-has taken place.8 0
I filed and gave value on making his general loan; his interest therefore per-
fects as soon as the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. If, at this time,
PM has not yet taken all the steps necessary to perfect his interest, I's in-
terest will perfect first and, under the first-to-perfect rule of section 9-312
(5) (b), I will have priority. On the other hand, if, by the time the debtor
has rights in the collateral, PM has also given value and taken any other
steps necessary for perfection, the interests of both I and PM will perfect at
the same time-when the debtor obtains rights. Since, in this event, the Code
does not accord priority to either party, their interests are presumably on a
parity.
The time at which the debtor acquires rights in the collateral may thus be
of crucial importance. Unfortunately, aside from providing that "rights in-
cludes remedies,""' the Code does not attempt to set forth what is meant by
"rights in the collateral." The hypothetical debtor being a buyer, the time as
of which he "has rights" must be determined under the article on sales.
The first rights which accrue to the debtor-buyer are those arising upon
identification of the goods to the contract of sale. At that point, he receives
the buyer before releasing the bill of lading to him. In such a case, the bank would be
offering credit analogous to that ordinarily offered by a bank that discounts a seller's
draft. Section 9-309 gives priority to banks engaging in purely documentary financing
presumably to protect negotiability and on the ground that the banks are engaging in
short-term, self-liquidating transactions. As a holder in due course of the document of
title, the bank would prevail over an earlier security interest in the goods even though
perfected. This special priority is limited, however, to the documentary period, and would
be ineffective after the bills were released to the buyer. Upon release, if the bank has
not been paid, priority of any security interest retained would depend on the rules set
forth in UCC § 9-312 (1958 Supp.).
76. UCC § 9-304(5) (a).
77. "If a security interest is originally perfected in any way permitted under this
Article and is subsequently perfected in some other way under this Article, without an
intermediate period when it was unperfected, the security interest shall be deemed to be
perfected continuously for the purposes of this Article." UCC § 9-303(2).
78. UCC § 9-312(6) (1958 Supp.).
79. See note 8 supra.
80. See notes 2-10 supra and accompanying text.
81. UCC § 1-201(36).
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an insurable interest and, absent an express agreement to the contrary, "a
special property" in the goods.8 2 Should the seller become insolvent within
ten days after receiving the first installment on the purchase price, a buyer
who has a special property and who has paid for the goods in advance may
recover them from the seller by tendering the unpaid portion of the price.
3
In the case of a seller's breach, identification prior to breach empowers the
buyer to replevy the goods unless he is able to make a substitute purchase or
unless the seller's article 2 security interest has not been satisfied.8 4 Identi-
fication also entitles the buyer to a right of action against any third party
who has wrongfully dealt with the goods.
8 5
If the special property and insurable interest arising on identification are
not deemed to constitute sufficiently substantial rights in the goods to sup-
port a security interest, I's security interest will probably be held to perfect
when title passes to the buyer. Except when the parties have explicitly agreed
otherwise, the buyer obtains title to the goods "at the time and place at which
the seller completes his performance with reference to .. .delivery of the
goods ... ."80 Since the delivery of a document of title at another time and
place is irrelevant,8 7 the terms of shipment are determinative. If, for example.
the contract reads "f.o.b. destination," title passes upon tender at destina-
tion ;8s if "f.o.b. point of shipment," when the goods are turned over to the
carrier.
8
Considerable support can be mustered fo the view that title passage is a
prerequisite of attachment (and hence of perfection). Under traditional
theory, the location of title determines whether the creditors of the buyer or
of the seller have the right to levy upon the goods ;9O and, with exceptions
not here pertinent,9 ' the Code does not purport to change the law of creditors'
rights. 92 Arguably, the lien of a secured creditor of the buyer should not at-
tach to goods while they are still subject to levy by creditors of the seller.
particularly since the Code nowhere attempts to resolve the otherwise result-
82. UCC § 2-501(1). UCC § 2-401(1) requires the express contrary agreement.
83. UCC §2-502(1).
84. UCC §2-716(3).
85. UCC § 2-722.
86. UCC § 2-401(2).
87. Ibid.
88. UCC § 2-401(2) (b).
89. UCC § 2-401(2) (a).
90. See, e.g., Laughlin Motors v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 173 Kan. 600, 251
P.2d 857 (1952); Wheeler Lumber, Bridge & Supply Co. v. Shelton, 146 Ore. 550, 29
P.2d 1013 (1934).
91. UCC § 2-402(1) provides that the rights of unsecured creditors of the seller are
subject to the buyer's right to recover the goods under §§ 2-502 and 2-716. Under § 2-
402(2), local law determines when retention of goods sold by the seller is fraudulent as
to creditors, except that "retention of possession in good faith and current course of
trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identifi-
cation is not fraudulent."
92. See UCC § 2-402, comment.
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ing conflict of interests. A second argument rests on the fact that the time of
title passage can generally be ascertained more easily than that of identifica-
tion-which may occur at some vague point before shipment. 93 Title might
therefore appear to provide a more satisfactory point at which to say the
debtor now "has rights in the collateral" than does identification. Further-
more, the right to replevy against the seller rests not on identification alone
but also on the buyer's inability to obtain substitute goods,9 4 or his having
satisfied the seller's security interest in the goods,9 5 or his having prepaid a
portion of the price to the seller who becomes insolvent within ten days there-
after.96 Hence, the right in the goods which identification makes possible may
actually arise only when one of these other conditions occurs.
Although identification alone may not give the buyer rights in the goods
with respect to the seller, it may give the buyer sufficient rights vis-a-vis third
parties to permit a security interest in his creditor to attach. Once identifica-
tion occurs, the buyer has a "right of action" against third parties wrongfully
dealing with the goods.97 If he is thus enabled to recover the goods them-
selves (rather than or in addition to damages), then his "special property"
in the goods on their identification yields a right effective against anyone but
the seller. Such a right in the buyer appears substantial enough to justify the
recognition of a security interest in a creditor of the buyer. If the security
interest attaches before title passes, the resulting conflict between the secured
party and the seller's creditors is easily resolved on the assumption that,
whether the security interest is perfected or not, the secured party will have
no greater right against the seller's creditors than would the debtor-buyer.
So assuming, a court could hold that the special property obtained on identi-
fication of the goods is a sufficient right to support attachment; that (in the
,hypothetical situation) I perfected on identification for the purpose of deter-
mining his rights against other secured parties such as PM and against un-
secured creditors of the debtor-buyer; but that I's perfected interest is, never-
theless, subordinate to the rights of the seller's creditors so long as those
creditors would prevail against the buyer-that is, so long as the seller retains
title.
The need to protect the general inventory financer (here, I) with respect
to after-acquired property suggests that the debtor should be considered to
obtain rights in the collateral upon identification. Financers like I frequently
make advances on the basis of new acquisitions.9" The Code's general policy
93. UCC § 2-501, pertaining to identification, provides that in the absence of explicit
agreement otherwise, when the contract is for the sale of future goods other than crops,
identification occurs when the "goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by
the seller as goods to which the contract refers." See UCC § 2-501, comment 2.
94. UCC §2-716(3).
95. UCC §2-716(3).
96. UCC § 2-502.
97. UCC § 2-722.
98. See generally Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 588 (1949).
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is to encourage a continuing relationship between a borrower and lender in
the position of I and his debtor, so that a good security interest can be main-
tained with a minimum of expense, uncertainty and record-searching. 99 Ac-
cordingly, a parity interest in PM should be avoided. Permitting him to at-
tain such an interest without his having given notice to, or filed before, I will
discourage the latter from making new advances. But if title passage is deemed
the point as of which the debtor "has rights in the collateral," the interests
of I and PM could perfect simultaneously, for PM might have taken all other
steps necessary to perfect his interest in the document of title before rights
vested in the debtor. In contrast, were identification held to perfect I's in-
terest, perfection would occur before possession by PM, and I would have
priority as the first to perfect--except in the rare case in which PM's taking
possession constituted identification. Thus, if identification is characterized as
the time at which the debtor receives rights sufficient to support a security
interest, parity interests ordinarily can be avoided.
Designating identification as the time when a buyer acquires rights in the
collateral also avoids problems raised by the ambiguous language of section
9-304(2) : "During the period that goods are in the possession of the issuer
of a negotiable document therefor, a security interest in the goods is perfected
by perfecting a security interest in the document, and any security interest in
the goods otherwise perfected during such period is subject thereto." This
section enables PM-once he has perfected his interest in the goods by pos-
sessing, or filing his interest in, the carrier's bill of lading-to defeat all
parties who perfect their interests in the goods, but not in the bill, while the
bill is outstanding. 1' ° If the priority thus accorded PM by 9-304(2) is limited
in time to the documentary period (the period during which the bill is out-
standing), that section makes his interest superior to fewer conflicting inter-
ests than does section 9-309, which grants "a holder .. . [of] a negotiable
document" priority over all interests irrespective of when they perfected.1' 1
Section 9-304(2) can be read as other than a truncated redundancy, how-
ever. Broadly construed, it would extend PM's priority over interests perfect-
ing during the documentary period beyond the expiration of that period; such
priority would continue after PM had surrendered the bill and continued the
perfection of his interest through timely filing.10 2 Thus, PM could file sub-
99. UCC §§ 9-101 and 9-402, comments.
100.. An ambiguity is raised by the language "and any security interest in the goods
otherwise perfected during such period is subject thereto." "Otherwise perfected during,
such period" can be read to mean any interest enjoying the status of perfection during
the period. Such a reading would give priority to the party perfecting an interest in the
document over all earlier perfected interests irrespective of the time of perfection. In
all likelihood, however, "otherwise perfected during such period" refers to interests
which were actually perfected during the period.
101. Such a purchase-money financer would seem to qualify as the "holder" of a
"duly negotiated" document envisaged by UCC § 9-309. See UCC § 7-501 and comment.
102. Under UCC § 9-304(5), a secured party holding a perfected interest in a docu-
ment has twenty-one days in which to file his interest after releasing the document to
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sequent to the documentary period and defeat parties who, during the docu-
mentary period, perfected interests previously filed in the goods but not the
document. This result would permit him to avoid the requirements of section
9-312(3), which, when applicable, compel a purchase-money lender to give
earlier filers "notification . . . before the debtor receives possession of the
collateral" in order to attain priority over them.
Earlier filers such as I can receive the protection of 9-312(3) if priority
is not determined by 9-304(2). The latter section governs priority solely
with respect to interests perfected "on goods covered by documents."' 03 There-
fore, absent notice under 9-312(3), I can attain priority as against PM by
perfecting his interest before the bill of lading is issued. Since PM did not
perfect until receiving the bill, I would thus acquire priority under the first-
to-perfect rule of section 9-312(5) (b).
If the debtor's rights arise upon identification and identification occurs
before shipment, that is, before the goods are embodied in the bill of lading,
the perfection of I's interest would precede the goods' being "covered by
documents"; hence, I would have priority under section 9-312(5) (b). If.
however, the debtor's rights depend on title passage and title does not pass
before shipment, I's interest would perfect while the goods are "covered by
documents"; 9-302(2) would therefore establish PM's priority. I could still
avoid the subordination of his interest in this situation by including docu-
ments in his original financing statement.1 0 4 Then, should title pass after ship-
ment or on PM's possessing the bill, both lenders would perfect an interest
in the goods by perfecting an interest in the bill. And, under section 9-304(2).
neither would enjoy priority. Should title pass on shipment, I would receive
priority as the first to perfect, since PM would not obtain possession of the
bill until later.
Even if the debtor's rights date from identification, PM might be able to
gain parity. His interest could be construed as a continuation of the seller's
automatically perfected article 2 security interest, consisting of the right to
withhold or stop delivery of the goods.10 5 Since this interest passes to PM
when he pays the seller and receives the bill of lading, 06 and since it remains
perfected without filing until the debtor takes possession of the goods,
10 7 PM
can argue that his security interest is, in effect, the extension of an already
perfected interest. So viewed, his interest would be continuously perfected
the debtor for eventual sale or exchange of the goods. UCC § 9-303(2) would make
his interest continuously perfected from the time of perfection through possession of the
document.
Literally read and broadly construed, UCC § 9-304(2) would extend PM's priority
beyond the documentary period even in the absence of perfection through filing. Doubt-
less, no court would permit this result.
103. UCC § 9-312(1).
104. UCC § 9-304(1).
105. UCC § 2-506(1).
106. Ibid.
107. UCC § 9-113.
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from the time of identification, which was when the seller's interest per-
fected.' 08 I also having perfected at that time, PM would thus achieve parity.
The reasons already advanced for fostering the relationship between a gen-
eral inventory financer and his borrower dictate that the article 2 security
interest not be treated so as to award PM parity. This result appears con-
sonant with article 9, which can be read to allow only a variously perfected
article 9 interest to be "perfected continuously."' 0 9 More important, the sell-
er's security interest which devolves on PM is fundamentally different from
the interest which he can assert against the goods once the buyer has pos-
session. The essence of the seller's interest is the power to withhold or stop
delivery before the buyer possesses the goods. After the buyer takes them,
however, PM can no longer exercise the right of stoppage derived from the
seller. Unlike the seller's article 2 interest, any security interest which PM
then holds exists not because of the secured party's status, but because of a
security agreement under which PM extended credit to the buyer. PM per-
fected this (article 9) interest when he acquired the bill of lading. Having
already perfected by then, I would enjoy priority.
Despite the difficulties which the first-to-perfect rule can present, its appli-
cation may have merit when, before any other interest is filed, PM advances
money against documents and perfects a security interest by possessing
them.110 Suppose that I then files and that later, the documents having been
released to permit the debtor to obtain the goods, PM files."" If section
9-312(3) controlled, PM could not achieve priority over I, a prior filer, with-
out giving him notice. But PM could not reasonably be expected to give
notice on perfecting his interest, since I at that time had not yet filed. Hence,
the December 1958 amendment of the Code, assuring I priority under section
9-312(5) (b) when, as here, he is the first to perfect, might seem justified.
Even here, however, the first-to-perfect rule could produce undesirable con-
sequences. On filing, I cannot determine whether an outstanding lien, per-
fected through documents and without filing, will subsequently be filed when
the debtor obtains the goods represented by the documents." 2 I may there-
fore either run the risk of making a future advance against previously en-
cumbered collateral, or else feel compelled to reinspect the public records be-
fore making such an advance. Both alternatives seem inconsistent with the
Code sections which enable the general inventory financer (here I) to protect
his interest through notice filing, and which require that a purchase-money
108. See UCC § 9-303(2), quoted note 77 supra.
109. See ibid. UCC § 9-113 makes article 2 security interests generally "subject to"
article 9, but does not classify these interests as "perfected . . . under" article 9. Since
the latter phrase defines interests capable of continuous perfection by virtue of UCC
§ 9-303(2), literal reading would preclude such continuity.
110. See UCC § 9-305.
111. This filing produces an interest perfected continuously from the time of per-
fection through possession of the document. See text accompanying notes 75-77 mtpra.
112. For pertinent Code provisions, see UCC §§ 9-304(5), 9-303(2).
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lender notify the holder of an earlier-filed interest in inventory."13 For this
reason, once PM files an interest in the goods, he could be allowed to attain
priority over I only by giving him prompt notification, and not allowed prior-
ity as the first to perfect. Achieving this result would involve amending the
notification section, 9-312, so that a purchase-money lender who perfected
before filing could not, after filing, attain priority over the holders of earlier-
filed interests unless he notified them in a timely fashion. Implementing such
a notification requirement would also necessitate restricting PM's section
9-304(2) priority-which arises without notice being given under 9-312(3)-
to the period during which his interest is perfected by virtue of its having
attached in the bill of lading."14 Thus, section 9-304(2) would have to be
amended to correlate priority thereunder with documentary perfection.", The
foregoing amendments would protect I should he file between perfection and
filing by PM. They would also remove the many ambiguities arising from
the interplay of priorities under sections 9-304(2), 9-312(3), and the first-
to-perfect rule.
113. See UCC §§ 9-101, comment, 9-402, comment, 2. Compare note 66 supra.
114. For this period, see UCC § 9-304.
115. In addition, such an amendment would solve the conceptual problem found in
the second paragraph of note 102 supra.
